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Saving for a  
Sunny Day
Why should people—and economies—save? The typical answer usually 
focuses on the need to protect against future shocks, to smooth con-
sumption during hard times, in short, to save for the proverbial rainy day. 
This book approaches the question from a slightly different angle. While 
saving to survive the bad times is important, saving to thrive in the good 
times is what really counts. People must save so they can invest in their 
own and their children’s health and education, live productive fulfilling 
lives, and end their days in comfort and peace. Firms must save so they 
can grow productive enterprises that employ more workers in better 
jobs to produce quality goods for domestic and international markets. 
Governments must save to build bridges, highways, and airports that 
support a productive economy, to provide quality services such as edu-
cation, health, water, and sanitation to their citizens, and to assure their 
senior citizens a dignified, worry-free retirement. In short, countries must 
save for a sunny day—a time when everyone can bask in the benefits of 
growth, prosperity, and well-being.
To have even a chance of reaching that sunny day, this book argues 
that Latin America and the Caribbean must save more and save better. It 
contends that saving in the region is too low and that the savings that do 
exist can be used more efficiently to enhance growth and development. 
The purpose of this book is to raise awareness about the urgent need to 
promote more and better saving to address several of the region’s most 
pressing issues including lackluster growth, low investment rates, and 
the growing need to care for an aging population.
Why should economies care about how much they save? After all, if 
economies can always borrow from abroad, then national saving rates 
should not matter. However, borrowing from abroad may be more costly 
and may raise the risk of crises. Foreign financial flows are fickle, and 




America and the Caribbean is no stranger to the currency and financial 
turmoil generated by external debt. Importing saving from abroad is far 
from a perfect substitute to boosting saving at home.
Given the limits to external borrowing, countries that save more 
also invest more. In other words, there is a positive association between 
national saving and domestic investment (investment in the real econ-
omy, not purely financial investment). From a policy perspective, it is 
useful to understand which drives which: whether higher saving leads to 
more real investment or whether better investment opportunities lead to 
increases in saving. This book argues that causality runs in both direc-
tions. Or more precisely, that Latin America and the Caribbean suffers 
from two reinforcing problems: low saving supply and weak investment 
demand. Solving these problems and breaking the vicious cycle between 
them demands concerted and swift policy action to increase saving and 
investment.
Savings: The Sum of its Parts
National saving is the sum of all the individual saving decisions of the 
agents in the economy: households, firms, and government agencies. 
While a macroeconomic analysis is instructive, in the end saving deci-
sions are made by individuals and reflect the information they have and 
the many real-life considerations that may influence their behavior. To 
fully understand the problem of saving, it is imperative to break down 
and analyze how the savings generated by households, firms, and gov-
ernment agencies is aggregated and channeled to the economy.
The financial system is the middle man: it moves the resources from 
people who save to those who need the resources to invest. Small and 
inefficient financial systems, like those in Latin America and the Carib-
bean, jack up the costs for financial services, which in turn depress both 
saving (by reducing effective returns to savers) and investment (by 
increasing the cost of credit to borrowers). In such contexts, households 
that lack access to good financial savings instruments may opt to save in 
other ways—by accumulating cash or jewelry, by buying durable goods, 
or by investing in the family firm— which may not be the most produc-
tive. These mechanisms reduce the collective efficiency with which the 
existing savings are used. A good financial system not only mobilizes 
savings but also pools them and allocates them efficiently to finance 
the projects with the highest returns. If savings are not pooled within a 
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well-functioning financial system, then the overall economy suffers a loss, 
as do the individuals and firms in that economy. Efficient financial inter-
mediation encourages more saving and ensures that savings are used in 
the most productive fashion, supporting growth and development.
Despite the financial deregulation and reforms of recent decades, 
financial systems in Latin America and the Caribbean remain very shallow 
by international standards. While the median banking system in the region 
has grown to provide approximately 30 percent of GDP in loans to the pri-
vate sector, this level remains much lower than the banking systems of the 
median OECD or Emerging Asia economy, which provide approximately 
80 and 100 percent of GDP in loans to the private sector, respectively.
Households in the region, especially lower-income households, have 
limited access to adequate financial instruments to save. They face rela-
tively high costs to access and use the available instruments and often do 
not trust formal banks. As a result, households save less than they oth-
erwise would; or when they save, they do so using nonfinancial vehicles.
The lack of development and coverage of pension systems in the 
region is another severe constraint for saving. Less than half the popula-
tion in Latin America and the Caribbean saves for retirement through a 
contributory pension system. Households simply do not save enough for 
retirement, and do not make up for the lack of pension saving through 
nonpension saving instruments. This situation is a crisis in the making 
that will worsen as the region inevitably ages. Pension regimes by and 
large have failed to prepare countries for the demographic transition 
underway in their societies. In addition to low pension coverage, exten-
sive labor informality, widespread financial illiteracy, and lack of trust in 
financial systems seriously hamper household saving.
In the case of firms, saving decisions are intimately connected to 
their investment needs. Firms save (that is, retain earnings) because 
internal funds are cheaper: they are free from the intermediation costs 
of bank credit. When the cost of external credit is too high, self-financing 
may become the only feasible way for firms to finance investments. But 
when firms lack sufficient retained earnings or external credit in the form 
and amount they need, they forego productive opportunities. Remov-
ing distortions in financial markets that prevent firms from accessing 
the funding they need at a reasonable cost would enable firms to take 
on productive investment projects with high returns. This, in turn, would 
encourage more saving, as both households and firms would want to 
save more to benefit from the higher returns to investment.
4 SAvING FOR DEvELOPMENT
Distortions in labor and product markets also set the stage for mis-
allocating economic resources and, therefore, limiting productivity 
growth. Scores of small, informal, and unproductive firms in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean limp along on the crutches of lower input costs or 
higher product prices thanks to taxes and poorly enforced regulations. 
Removing these preexisting distortions would put everyone on an even 
footing, improve the business environment, boost investment and, even-
tually, saving.
Government agencies also save. The political economy literature 
abounds with theories as to why governments consume too much and 
save and invest too little. Governments with short time horizons may shy 
away from long-term investments. Governments with windfall revenues 
(say, from commodity price booms) may be tempted to dole out the pro-
ceeds to their constituencies today, rather than risk others spending in 
a different fashion tomorrow. Adding to the problem, governments tend 
to spend inefficiently. Subsidies and/or social transfer programs may be 
poorly targeted, or the quality of spending is low. These inefficiencies 
lead to government overspending. Reducing spending inefficiencies 
would amount to increasing public saving: more money would be freed 
up for higher quality and more productive public outlays.
Impediments and distortions to saving by households, firms, and 
government agencies take a toll on the efficiency with which available 
savings are used. The absence of long-term saving instruments can steer 
investments away from projects with long horizons that are necessary to 
raise economic productivity and growth.
A case in point is infrastructure investment such as ports, roads, rail-
ways, energy, communication networks, and water and sanitation. Latin 
America and the Caribbean suffers from the dual problems of low-qual-
ity physical infrastructure and insufficient annual investment to close the 
infrastructure gap. The region must increase investment by between 2 
and 4 percentage points of GDP per year for decades to loosen this 
binding constraint on growth. Low national saving limits the financing 
available for building and maintaining productive infrastructure. Poor 
infrastructure, in turn, results in the inadequate provision of services 
such as potable water, sanitation, health, communications, transporta-
tion, and even public safety. These deficiencies prevent households from 
living the productive, healthy lives that they aspire to. It also slows entre-
preneurs with good ideas from expanding their businesses and adding 
capital and high productivity jobs to the economy.
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Saving also matters to the day-to-day life of individuals. Households 
that either do not save, or save primarily through informal mechanisms, 
usually have more difficulty dealing with shocks such as losing a job or ill-
ness; it is harder for them to invest in education or other forms of human 
capital; and they do not have the reserves to ride out hard times (smooth 
consumption). For many individuals, it is too difficult to save when they 
struggle to make ends meet. However, low-income households do need 
adequate saving instruments; the problem is that they are not available.
On top of all these pressing needs, the population of Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean is aging fast. For the past four decades, most 
countries in the region have benefited from a bonus in the form of an 
increase in the working-age population. More workers made it easier to 
take care of a relatively smaller pool of elderly people through intergen-
erational transfers (either arrangements within the family, or to a lesser 
extent, through pensions). This bonus has now ended in many coun-
tries, or will end very soon for the rest. Population graying will fuel the 
demand for resources to meet the greater needs of an expanding group 
of elderly people. The policy challenge is to ensure that the necessary 
savings are mobilized now. The alternatives are sad indeed: siphon off 
more resources from a shrinking working-age population through sig-
nificantly higher taxes, or face the moral challenge of relegating a large 
share of the elderly population to live in poverty. The region’s aging is 
inevitable. Saving now is an antidote for the looming aging crisis.
Why Care about National Saving?
National saving is the vehicle through which the region can become sta-
ble and confident in its own future. Yet countries in Latin America and 
the Caribbean are falling short of this goal. They save less than 20 per-
cent of their national income. By contrast, the high-growth countries in 
East Asia save about 35 percent of national income. Latin America and 
the Caribbean saves less than every other region in the world, except 
Sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, investment rates are lower than 
what would be needed to sustain high rates of economic growth.1 The 
region is not putting aside enough resources today to build a better, 
brighter future.
Can countries substitute low national saving rates by importing sav-
ings from abroad? Not perfectly. Few countries have been able to import 
savings for prolonged periods of time without abrupt reversals or without 
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incurring severe external indebtedness problems that lead to recurrent 
financial crises. Crisis-related volatility generates disincentives to save 
locally because the real value of savings usually falls after crises. People 
naturally want to protect the real value of their hard-earned savings; thus, 
they often channel savings abroad, purchase durable goods, or step up 
consumption rather than invest locally when there is too much volatil-
ity. High volatility may also discourage foreigners from lending at longer 
terms and lower cost. A negative cycle sets in whereby low national sav-
ing fuels the need for more foreign savings, which becomes ever more 
difficult to attract, increases external borrowing costs, induces financial 
fragility and crises—and feeds back into another shaky cycle. Mobilizing 
national saving would help break the cycle and set into motion the oppo-
site dynamic. Foreign saving can be a necessary and useful complement 
to national saving, but it is far from a perfect substitute.
Sharing the Blame for Low Saving
Demographic factors—such as the number of working to non-working 
age people in a country at a given point in time—matter for saving. Are 
demographic factors to blame for the region’s low saving rates? The 
answer is no. Beginning in the 1960s, the region embarked on a “sav-
ing-friendly” demographic transition (with decreasing age dependency 
ratios), very much like high-saving countries in Asia. In 1965, for each 
100 individuals of working age, there were 90 dependents, either young 
or old; today there are fewer than 50.Yet, unlike Asia, national saving 
rates in Latin America have not increased much. If favorable demo-
graphic factors had been fully exploited, the average saving rate in 
Latin America and the Caribbean should be about 8 percentage points 
of GDP higher. 2
various nondemographic factors have kept the saving rates in the 
region from rising, despite the demographic bonus. One is the lack of 
adequate saving instruments. The perennial problems of lack of trust in 
financial institutions and high costs of doing business with banks discour-
age households from placing their savings in formal financial institutions. 
Only about 16 percent of the adult population in Latin America and the 
Caribbean report saving through a bank, compared to 40 percent in 
Emerging Asia, and 50 percent in advanced economies.3 Instead, house-
holds in the region—especially relatively poorer households— save more 
through informal mechanisms, or just give up on saving altogether.
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Another factor that has depressed saving is the state of the region’s 
pension systems. They cover less than half the population, and many 
of them face long-term sustainability challenges. Most people in Latin 
America and the Caribbean do not save through pension systems, or 
they do not save for enough years to qualify for a contributory pen-
sion at the end of their working lives. Importantly, they do not make up 
for the lack of pension contributions with higher voluntary saving. The 
pension crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean is effectively a saving 
problem, with serious social implications.
Fiscal policy has also been a drag on saving in the region. Two long-
standing problems of public finance remain largely unaddressed and 
have a direct bearing on public saving. First, the composition of public 
expenditures is more oriented toward current expenditure (consump-
tion) than to public investment (saving). Distorted incentives bias public 
expenditures toward current spending and away from capital investment 
over the economic cycle. In good times, political economy incentives 
encourage governments to increase spending across the board. In bad 
times, it is usually politically more expedient for governments to cut (or 
postpone) capital expenditure projects than to reduce other expendi-
tures. For example, total expenditure in Latin America and the Caribbean 
from 2007 to 2014 increased by a very significant 3.7 percent of GDP, 
but more than 90 percent went into current expenditure, and only 8 per-
cent was devoted to longer-term public investment.
Second, there is considerable leakage in spending areas such as 
social assistance, tax expenditures and subsidies to energy that average 
about 2 percent of GDP in the region. In addition, inefficiencies in health 
and education expenditures average approximately 1 percent of GDP. 
These leakages and inefficiencies are in essence public saving that is for-
gone. In good times, nobody pays much attention to these inefficiencies 
because they are hidden behind positive headline fiscal numbers. But 
when tax revenues fall, these inefficiencies loom large.
Taxation also directly impacts saving because tax revenue is one of 
the components of public saving (see Box 1.1). And it indirectly impacts 
saving through the incentives it provides to individuals and firms to save. 
Widespread tax evasion in the region is a problem on both fronts: it 
reduces tax revenues, and it distorts the incentives of compliers versus 
noncompliers. Tax evasion is, on average, about 52 percent of potential 
tax collection in Latin America: that is, about half of potential revenues 
are lost through tax evasion.4
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Many countries in the region impose a high tax burden on comply-
ing taxpayers but collect relatively little in tax revenue (as a share of 
GDP). This is the worst possible combination for saving: a tax system 
that imposes very high tax rates (thereby distorting private saving 
decisions) and collects very little revenue (thereby not adding much 
to public revenue and potentially not adding to public saving). This 
anomaly is compounded by the types of taxes that are paid and who 
pays those taxes in the region. For example, considering all taxes on 
firms’ profits (turnover taxes, financial transaction taxes, and payroll 
taxes on employers), the burden of taxation for a typical formal firm 
in Latin America reaches about 51 percent of profits, compared to 
only 28 percent in Emerging Asia and about 41 percent in advanced 
countries.5
Distortions in financial markets such as the high cost of enforc-
ing contracts, or the lack of information about the creditworthiness of 
potential borrowers, raise the cost of credit for productive firms. This lim-
its the ability of firms with good investment projects to invest and grow. 
The result is a misallocation of economic resources and lower aggre-
gate productivity. This, in turn, generates disincentives to save because 
an economy with low productivity growth is essentially an economy in 
which returns to saving and investment are also low. Distortions beyond 
financial markets also matter for productivity growth and saving. Labor 
markets distorted by high levels of informality, inefficient or inequitable 
BOX 1.1. DEFINING SAVINGS AND ITS COMPONENTS
Total saving in an economy is the current national income that is not con-
sumed. Therefore, it is equal to domestic (real) investment. In turn, total saving 
can be broken down into national and foreign saving. National saving is the 
sum of the saving of households and firms plus the saving of public sector 
agencies. For ign saving is the net capital that inflows to the economy (that 
is, net external borrowing). Figure B1.1 illu trates these fundamental account-
ing relationships.
Total saving has two main components: gross national saving (GNS) and 
foreign saving (FS).
Gross national saving is the national income (gross national income, GNI) 
minus private and public consumption (C and G, respectively). Private saving 
is GNI minus taxes (T) minus private co sumption (C). Public saving is taxes 
(T) minus public consumption (G).
Foreign saving is equal to the current account deficit (CAD) in the balance 
of payments. This is the net of gross capital inflows to the economy (defined 
as the changes in the stock of international liabilities) and gross capital out-
flows from the economy (defined as changes in the stock of foreign asset 
holdings by residents).






















Note: C = private consumption; CAD = current account deficit; G = public consumption; 
GNI = gross national income; T= taxes. 
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social policy regulations, special tax regimes, or a combination of these 
factors, change the private profitability of investment projects and lead 
to socially inefficient investments. Removing these distortions would 
increase productivity, investment, and savings.
How to Promote Saving for Development
This book outlines how to increase saving for the future in sustainable 
ways. A comprehensive agenda to mobilize saving combines public poli-
cies to stimulate saving directly, such as measures related to fiscal policy 
and pensions, with policies that operate indirectly by removing con-
straints that impede agents from saving—and particularly from saving 
efficiently, in ways that support economic growth and welfare. Improv-
ing the efficiency with which savings are used also requires eliminating 
the distortions that waste economic resources and restrain productivity 
growth—and thus reduce investment demand.
Tackle the pension problem. A solution to Latin America’s saving prob-
lem requires fixing broken pension systems. Countries in the region have 
promised to pay very generous pensions to their retirees, but they have 
not saved enough to fulfill those promises for everyone. Most pension 
systems in the region face structural challenges associated with infor-
mality and low contribution rates. The public debate in the region largely 
revolves around whether pension systems should be based on individual 
accounts (fully funded) or pay-as-you-go (PAYG) approaches. However, 
that is not necessarily the most relevant debate.
Countries with pension systems based on individual saving 
accounts—or that want to move in that direction—must realize that 
these systems per se cannot resolve their saving woes. First, if too few 
people are covered or contribute to the system, and/or contributions 
throughout the working life of an individual fall short of providing 
adequate pension benefits at retirement (either because contribu-
tions are low or because the returns to those contributions during the 
investment period are low), then the government will have to shell out 
resources to make up the deficit. This will continue to be a drag on 
national saving. Moreover, transition costs have piled up from shift-
ing pension systems from pay-as-you-go structures (which is how all 
pension systems in the region began) to systems based on individ-
ual accounts because the commitments made to contributors under 
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the pay-as-you-go systems must be fulfilled. This can be a substantial 
drain on public resources.
Countries with pay-as-you-go systems must adjust the systems’ 
parameters (such as the retirement age, level of benefits, and required 
years of contributions) to avoid unfunded and/or unsustainable systems 
down the road. So far, the problem has been hidden behind favorable 
demographic trends (with relatively more contributors to the pool 
than retirees receiving benefits). Yet despite the favorable demograph-
ics, pay-as-you-go systems have not built adequate reserves by saving 
(and investing) the excess contributions. Pay-as-you-go pension systems 
should and must save, creating adequate reserve funds to ensure their 
long-run sustainability. Importantly, the inevitable fixes to the systems’ 
parameters should come before expanding benefits to more people; oth-
erwise, adding beneficiaries, without addressing the underlying problems 
of the system, increases the demands on a shrinking pool of resources.
Because pension coverage is inadequate in the two types of contrib-
utory pension systems that coexist in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
noncontributory pension programs are proliferating. Noncontributory 
pensions provide payments to people who have either not contributed, 
or do not qualify for a contributory pension. Today, noncontributory 
pensions account for one-third of pension coverage in the region. In 
several countries, more people receive noncontributory pensions than 
contributory pensions. The noncontributory pensions with the highest 
coverage cost between 0.7 percent and 1 percent of GDP. This cost will 
more than double by 2050 if generosity and coverage remain constant, 
just to account for changes in demographics.
The possible effects that noncontributory pensions may have on 
incentives to save are also important. The emergence of these pen-
sions has yielded some very relevant insights into how individuals and 
households react to changes in benefits. Noncontributory pensions 
steal beneficiaries away from contributory systems, and in some cases 
decrease their savings. They also reduce the transfers that beneficiary 
households receive from other households.6 To minimize unintended 
negative consequences on saving either through excessive fiscal costs, 
or indirectly by crowding out saving, these programs must be carefully 
designed and funded, and targeted only to the population at risk of old-
age poverty.
Increasing pension saving can also help solve another perennial 
problem of the region: the lack of long-term funding in local currencies 
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available to finance investment. Infrastructure investment is a highly 
productive form of investment in short supply in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. To be viable and sustainable over time, infrastructure invest-
ment requires long-term financing—precisely the type of financing that 
comes with national saving. As countries raise pension saving, the accu-
mulated resources—which by definition are locked up for some time—can 
be increasingly channeled to finance infrastructure investments.
To do so, policymakers in the region must set up the rules of the 
game. The first step is to promote the development of an “investible 
asset class” that permits accumulated savings to be channeled into 
investment in infrastructure. Since well-planned and executed infrastruc-
ture investment is highly productive, the returns on saving generated by 
these investments can potentially be very large and support the long-
term sustainability of pension systems.
However, the region is starting from a very low point, as many coun-
tries still have amassed few resources in pension funds, particularly in 
countries with pay-as-you-go systems. Therefore, the expectation that 
higher pension saving by itself will solve the region’s infrastructure gap 
is unrealistic.
Focus on infrastructure and capital spending. To increase investment 
to close the infrastructure gap, the region needs to boost public sav-
ing and investment. The public sector is the main source of financing for 
infrastructure investment in the region and in the world. Increasing pub-
lic investment requires designing fiscal rules and targets that direct a 
higher share of total expenditures to public investment and counter the 
political economy forces that bias expenditures toward current expendi-
tures in both good and bad times.
Over the last two decades, improved fiscal frameworks have deliv-
ered higher public saving in many countries. Yet more effort is needed 
just when a challenging economic environment has made doing so more 
difficult. The good news is that substantial public saving can still be gen-
erated without having to rely on the traditional tools of raising taxes or 
reducing expenditures across the board.
First, governments must realize that the composition of public 
expenditures is a direct determinant of the level of public saving. Gov-
ernments have room to boost public saving by increasing the share of 
capital expenditures, which is low in the region, with respect to cur-
rent spending, which is high. This requires a more prudent approach 
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to fiscal policy. As a general rule, only a small fraction of any change in 
commodity prices or other external factors should be considered per-
manent. Then, current expenditures will be expanded relatively less in 
good times (the upside of the typical business cycle) and reduced more 
in the downturns.
Second, savings of approximately 2 percent of GDP on average 
could be generated by reducing leakage in current expenditures in areas 
such as social assistance, tax expenditures, and subsidies to the energy 
sector. That means making sure that spending reaches its intended ben-
eficiaries only. Designing and implementing reforms to make public 
expenditures more efficient should rank high on the policy agendas of 
governments throughout the region.
Target tax policy better. Governments can also encourage saving 
through tax policy. Income taxes are levied on both individuals (per-
sonal income tax) and firms (corporate income tax). But households 
collectively own firms; therefore tax policy should consider integrating 
personal and corporate income taxes, and avoiding double taxation of 
savings: first, when it is generated by the firm, and then when it is dis-
tributed to households as dividends.7 Personal income taxes across the 
region should continue evolving into a dual system,8 with a lower flat tax 
on capital, in which all forms of capital income (interest payments, divi-
dends, and capital gains) receive equal tax treatment. Corporate income 
tax rates should fall in line with international trends to facilitate the for-
malization of informal firms.9 This would help expand the tax base, which 
is currently low.10
Countries in the region must also reconsider tax preferences that 
favor investing in housing rather than financial instruments such as 
stocks, bonds, and term deposits in banks. Loopholes in the tax codes 
in many countries discriminate against nonhousing saving vehicles while 
mostly benefiting high-income households. Leveling off tax incentives 
for housing with other forms of financial saving is generally a better 
option than introducing new tax incentives for certain types of financial 
saving. In the past, many advanced countries introduced tax-preferred 
savings accounts, sometimes designed to encourage saving for educa-
tion, life insurance contracts, and other purposes. The evidence shows 
that these tax preferences did not increase saving. By and large, only 
the relatively rich used these vehicles, primarily to reduce their tax pay-
ments, with limited to no impact on total saving.11
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Promote household saving and create a savings culture. At the household 
level, saving rates in the region are distorted by a number of factors: high 
costs of accessing and using the financial system; lack of confidence in 
the financial system; poor financial regulation; little understanding about 
banks and how they work; and social pressures and behavioral biases. 
Successful financial inclusion requires more than just opening new bank 
accounts. It means tailoring saving products to the demands of poten-
tial clients, taking into account the various real-life constraints they face 
to save, and creating incentives to channel more savings through the 
formal financial system. Preliminary but encouraging evidence of public 
policy interventions and financial product innovations shows an increase 
in household saving, as well as promising initiatives to encourage more 
financial saving in particular. Making more and faster progress in these 
areas requires more dynamic regulation and supervision of the financial 
system and the collaborative efforts of financial regulators and bankers 
to implement reforms and promote even more innovation.
Government initiatives to pay social transfers through bank accounts 
and to channel remittances through domestic financial systems are use-
ful first steps. Additional progress in encouraging more financial saving 
demands improvements in the design of the programs: for example, by 
pairing payments with programs that provide financial education, and/
or with instruments to help users overcome the behavioral and social 
biases that constrain saving. Innovation and technology provide another 
opportunity to encourage more saving through the formal financial sys-
tem. While the penetration of mobile telephones is high in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, the region still lags behind in using mobile technol-
ogy for financial services and as a tool for financial inclusion because 
policy and regulations have not kept pace with the mobile telephone 
revolution.
A promising avenue for creating a saving culture in Latin America 
and the Caribbean is financial education, with a focus on children and 
youth. Positive saving habits are easier to instill during the early years, 
when the brain is still developing and learning is easier.
Improve productivity growth. Increasing national saving is necessary 
to achieve the region’s aspirations, but it is not enough. Evidence from 
around the world shows that historically, an increase in national sav-
ing rates coincided with higher economic growth only when the saving 
surges were accompanied by higher aggregate productivity growth. 
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This relationship underscores two points. First, a surge in saving rates 
can be sustained for long periods of time when it is associated with per-
manent incentives for individuals to save. And the incentives to save 
are higher when productivity grows faster. Second, in order for more 
saving to impact growth and development, the savings must be put to 
good use. That is, savings must be channeled to productive investment 
opportunities.
Total factor productivity (TFP) is ultimately the weighted sum of 
the productivity of the existing population of firms in the economy. TFP 
can grow because either firms in the economy become more produc-
tive, more resources are channeled to productive firms, or the market 
allows more productive firms to survive and less productive firms to 
exit. Latin America and the Caribbean is cluttered by a large number of 
small, informal, and unproductive firms that survive because they enjoy 
cheaper inputs and/or higher product prices. These factors, in turn, arise 
from distortionary taxes and regulations that are not properly enforced. 
Increasing aggregate productivity requires reducing those distortions. 
Doing so would improve the allocation of resources in the economy and 
increase aggregate saving and investment.
Fix the financial system. Efforts to create and sustain a culture of sav-
ing in the region must be complemented by efforts to help the financial 
system pool and allocate savings efficiently. Only by fixing the prob-
lems that discourage the use of financial systems for saving and limit the 
availability of financing for productive firms, can more saving turn into 
better saving for development.
Financial frictions are like sand in the wheels of the economy; they 
slow down economic progress. Two types of financial distortions are 
particularly acute in Latin America and the Caribbean and are amenable 
to policy action. First, banks do not have access to quality informa-
tion about potential borrowers. While the region has made progress 
in extending the coverage of credit bureaus that provide this informa-
tion, the quality and timeliness of the information available through such 
bureaus is still poor in many countries. On average, the regulatory frame-
work in Latin America is less conducive to information sharing than in 
other regions of the world.
A second problem is the high cost of enforcing financial con-
tracts in the region. The effective protection of property rights is 
particularly weak in Latin America. The good news is that examples of 
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successful reforms in the region have helped alleviate this constraint. 
Bankruptcy reforms in Brazil (2004–05), Colombia (2012), and more 
recently Chile (2014) appear to be lowering the costs of enforcing 
financial contracts.
The Many Faces of Saving
This book considers how changes in the different components of sav-
ing (see Box 1.1) contribute to total saving and investment in the overall 
economy. This approach allows a more comprehensive understanding 
of how public policies can affect saving by households, firms, and gov-
ernment agencies, while recognizing the important interrelationships 
between the different components. There are four possible interrelation-
ships to consider:
• Between private and public saving. While government thrift 
would increase public saving, this usually leads to an offset in pri-
vate saving because households and firms anticipate that with 
higher government saving today, lower taxes will be required in 
the future, and therefore they increase consumption today.
• Between household and firm saving. Households, which own 
firms, may factor firms’ saving decisions into their own con-
sumption decisions. Thus, higher saving by firms may be offset 
by lower saving by households.
• Between mandatory and voluntary household saving. House-
holds may choose how much to save for retirement, using both 
pension and nonpension saving instruments interchangeably. 
Therefore, any saving done through pension instruments may 
just be forgone saving through other instruments.
• Between national and foreign saving. If national and foreign 
saving were perfect substitutes, a shortage of national saving 
would simply be made up by higher imports of foreign saving.
Box 1.2 discusses the theoretical and empirical evidence for each 
of these interrelationships. Here, suffice it to say that the collective evi-
dence indicates that multiple possible offsets are only partial. Thus, 
increases in either public or private saving will increase national saving, 
but not on a one-to-one basis. And an increase in national saving will 
support higher domestic investment.
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A Policy Agenda for the Future
The book identifies six strategic goals for households, firms, and govern-
ments in the region.
First, governments must create an enabling environment for saving. 
This should become a high priority in the region’s policy agendas. The “sav-
ing glut” in other parts of the world will not make up for the saving deficit 
in the region because foreigners cannot be expected to invest for the long 
term in countries where their own citizens are not confident enough to save.
Second, governments across the region can generate more saving 
by spending more efficiently. In fact, during difficult economic times, 
targeting public expenditures may be the only politically viable way to 
increase public saving in many countries because it avoids the unpleas-
antries of traditional fiscal tightening such as raising taxes or cutting 
expenditures.
Third, governments should promote and facilitate the development 
of financial systems that offer a full range of saving and investment 
instruments for households and firms. Banks can support these efforts 
by reaching out to more people with better financial instruments.
Fourth, governments, pension regulators, supervisors, and public 
and private sector managers must collaborate to fix broken pension sys-
tems. Population aging poses a great threat to economic stability and 
prosperity. Pension systems across the region must become sustainable, 
equitable, and more inclusive.
Fifth, people in Latin America and the Caribbean must develop a 
saving culture. Saving is difficult because it involves sacrificing current 
consumption. If people do not internalize the benefits of saving more, 
it will be hard, or impossible, to overcome inertia. Right now, too many 
people across the region fail to see the benefits of saving. A culture is 
built from the bottom up. Starting early in life with financial education on 
the role of saving is a critical element for success.
Sixth, saving more will not be enough to support development. The 
additional saving must be put to good use. The investment distortions 
that plague the region and that weaken investment demand must be 
eliminated. These distortions include inefficiencies in financial markets, 
high informality in labor markets, lack of adequate and predictable reg-
ulations, and special tax regimes. These distortions squander economic 
resources and impede productivity growth, which in turn feeds low 
investment demand and reduces saving.
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BOX 1.2.  THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE COMPONENTS 
OF SAVING
Public versus Private Saving: Ricardian Equivalence
Do increases in public saving increase national saving? Governments’ actions 
on fiscal policy are usually offset by private saving. In fact, the offset could 
be one to one, under the conditions specified by Barro (1974) on “Ricard-
ian Equivalence,” such as complete capital markets and perfect foresight. For 
example, any increase in the fiscal deficit financed either by lower taxes or 
higher debt—both of which would leave permanent income of households un-
changed— would result in an equivalent increase in household saving, such 
that the net impact on national saving would be null.
However, the conditions that would enable a perfect offset are too strin-
gent. Since Barro’s paper, the literature has focused on assessing the degree 
of offset.a Estimates vary across studies, but they tend to cluster in the range 
of 0.4 to 0.6, suggesting that for every dollar by which public saving is re-
duced, private saving tends to increase by 40 to 60 cents.b While the offset 
is significantly less than one to one, the fact that there is a partial offset sug-
gests that putting the burden of rising national saving on fiscal policy alone is 
wrong. Governments should not overlook policies to mobilize private savings 
as well.
Firm versus Household Saving: Piercing the Corporate Veil
Within the private sector, part of the saving is generated by households and 
another portion by firms through retained earnings. Poterba (1987) noted 
that firms contributed a high share of private saving in the United States and 
went on to posit the “corporate veil hypothesis,” according to which house-
holds take full account of the saving made by businesses: that is, households 
“pierce” the corporate veil.
The argument rests on the fact that households are the ultimate owners 
of firms, and thus they adjust their saving plans in accordance with changes 
in firms’ saving decisions. However, various problems can invalidate the full 
piercing of the corporate veil in practice, such as asymmetric information and 
bounded rationality (Poterba, 1987). The resulting empirical prediction was 
that an increase (reduction) in firm saving will give rise to an increase (reduc-
tion) in private saving, albeit not one to one.
A handful of papers have researched the empirical nexus between 
household and firm saving, concluding that the offset is only partial. Grigoli, 
Herman, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2014) find that an additional dollar of firm 
saving translates into an increase of 42 cents in private saving. Using a differ-
ent sample, Bebczuk and Cavallo (2016) find that a $1 increase in firm saving 
reduces household saving by 40 cents—thereby increasing private saving by 
as much as 60 cents.
(continued on next page)
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The bottom line is that the saving decisions of households and firms are 
intertwined. An association between the two sectors should be taken into ac-
count, but the two forms of saving are not perfect substitutes.
Mandatory versus Voluntary Household Saving: The Pension Offset
Household saving includes a mandatory component in the form of pension 
contributions. The potential substitutability between mandatory and volun-
tary saving matters for policy. If they were perfect substitutes, then retirement 
policies would have no incidence on the level of saving: that is, every dollar 
saved through a pension instrument would be offset by an equal amount of 
forgone saving in nonpension instruments. What is the extent of the offset in 
practice? In this area as well, the evidence points to only partial substitution, 
although the magnitude remains contested.c
This is a relevant and contentious policy issue in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Beginning in the 1980s, the region was a pioneer in reforming pen-
sion systems from unfunded pay-as-you-go to fully funded regimes based on 
individual accounts. The objectives of the reforms were to increase pension 
coverage and reduce long-term fiscal vulnerabilities associated with the old 
systems. The reforms were also expected to increase private and national 
saving.
With the benefit of hindsight, researchers can evaluate the extent to 
which saving increased in the aftermath of the reforms. The evidence shows 
that private saving rose only moderately.d The increase in private saving was 
weak because the number of contributors to the reformed systems remained 
low, as, in turn, informality in labor markets remained high. In addition, the 
reforms created a deficit during the transition period (to fulfill the promises 
made to people who had contributed to the old systems) that persists in 
several countries, and that lessened the positive impact of the reforms on 
national saving.
Foreign versus National Saving: Imperfect Substitutes
There is a high positive correlation between national saving and domestic in-
vestment across countries (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980). Numerous studies 
have found— with very few exceptions—that the correlation is systematically 
greater than zero across countries and over time. The positive correlation 
reveals imperfect financial integration across countries: changes in national 
saving are not completely offset by changes in foreign saving. Therefore, while 
the correlation does not prove if higher national saving leads to investment 
or vice versa, it does underscore that an increase in national saving can be 
expected to be at least partially retained domestically, thereby ending up as 
additional investment, rather than completely exported abroad through capi-
tal flight.
BOX 1.2. (continued)
(continued on next page)
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For countries that need to raise domestic investment, the robust positive 
correlation between national saving and domestic investment shows that re-
course to importing foreign saving can be a helpful remedy, but is not a cure 
to low national saving. This conclusion is reinforced by two additional pieces 
of evidence presented in this book. First, for most countries, the net absorp-
tion of foreign saving is small relative to the volume of domestic investment 
(see chapter 2). Second, the financing of the domestic capital stock in each 
country has been predominantly national.e
a For a recent survey of the literature, see Röhn (2010).
b Background research conducted in the context of this project confirms this range. Becerra, 
Cavallo and Noy (2015) conduct reduced form regressions of the determinants of private 
saving rates using panel regressions. One of the determinants of private saving is the public 
saving rate. Their coefficient estimate on public saving is approximately –0.60, in line with 
previous estimates in the literature.
c Two strands of the literature have tested this hypothesis. The first strand analyzes the rela-
tionship between pension wealth and private savings using country case studies. Attanasio 
and Rohwedder (2003) and Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) find evidence for Italy and the 
United Kingdom of a high degree of substitution between pensions and voluntary saving. For 
some groups of workers, the elasticity of substitution is close to 0.9. Using similar methods, 
Coronado (1998), Aguila (2011), and Sandoval-Hernández (2012) find high offset coefficients 
for workers in Chile and Mexico. The second strand exploits cross-country evidence of varia-
tion of pension arrangements (and saving) and aggregate saving. Examples include Bailliu 
and Reisen (1998); López-Murphy and Musalem (2004); Bebczuk and Musalem (2006); Cle-
ments et al. (2011); and Bebczuk (2015a). A common thread across these studies is that they 
uncover a positive but very small impact of funded pension regimes on nonpension saving.
d See Bebczuk (2015a).
e Aizenman, Pinto, and Radziwill (2007) show that on average 90 percent of the stock of 
physical capital in developing countries has been self-financed through the accumulation of 
national savings. Background research conducted for this book confirms this result for Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
BOX 1.2. (continued)
In the end, measuring success in achieving these goals boils down to 
creating an environment where everybody shares the vision that more 
saving, and a better use of existing savings, is the solution to the region’s 
economic woes—and the path to a stable and confident region in which 
any aspiration is possible.
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Notes
1 See Commission on Growth and Development (2008).
2 See Cavallo, Sánchez, and valenzuela (2016).
3 See World Bank (2014b).
4 Corbacho, Fretes Cibils, and Lora (2013).
5 See World Bank and PwC (2015). 
6 See Juárez (2009).
7 Integrating corporate and personal income taxes proved to be very 
successful in encouraging saving in Chile. See Cerda et al. (2015).
8 For example, the dual income tax in Nordic countries combines a flat 
tax on capital income with a progressive labor income tax schedule. 
Several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have a dual 
or semi-dual system, but most are not integrated (Corbacho, Fretes 
Cibils, and Lora, 2013).
9 Corporate income tax rates have declined over the last 40 years from 
an average of 40 percent in 1980 to about 30 percent in the 2000s, 
and to 24 percent in 2014. Among the reasons for the decline, ongo-
ing research points to profit-shifting concerns and the attraction of 
investment and tax competition.
10 High taxation of formal firms can lead to both less saving and lower 
formal employment. In Colombia, Granda and Hamann (2015) show 
that lower taxes on profits increase firm saving in the formal sector, 
and increase labor formalization and entrepreneurship. Reducing pay-
roll taxes achieves similar qualitative results.
11 See OECD (2007); McDonald et al. (2011); Boadway (2015).
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